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Abstract  16 
Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios 17 
where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the 18 
hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small 19 
groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms 20 
that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the 21 
apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here we identify the cognitive 22 
mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We 23 
argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand 24 
others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions), and to 25 
create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-26 
based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes 27 
during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. 28 
Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to 29 
show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. 30 
 31 
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1. Introduction  35 
 36 
Concern for reputation is a key psychological mechanism for explaining the high levels of 37 
cooperation observed in humans. Obtaining a good reputation could lead to downstream 38 
benefits via one of two routes: individuals might be more likely to be chosen as a partner 39 
(reputation-based partner choice, Roberts, 1998) or they might be more likely to be rewarded 40 
by other individuals (‘indirect reciprocity’, Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; see Roberts 41 
et al. this issue for a detailed discussion and comparison). Despite the intensive focus on how 42 
cooperation can be theoretically promoted by concern for reputation, these theoretical models 43 
have tended to ‘black-box’ the psychology that underpins decision rules. In this review, we 44 
aim to highlight the psychological and cognitive mechanisms that might support reputation-45 
based cooperation in humans. We begin by discussing the ontogeny of reputation-based 46 
cooperation in humans, and the cognitive mechanisms that likely underpin the ability to 47 
evaluate and manage reputation. We argue that the requirement for these mechanisms might 48 
largely preclude the emergence of reputation-based cooperation in other species. We end by 49 
presenting a few examples where reputation-based cooperation in non-human species appears 50 
to exist, illustrating how reputation-based cooperation might sometimes be achieved by simpler 51 
cognitive means.  52 
 53 
2. Reputation-based cooperation in humans and other primates 54 
 55 
Reputation-based cooperation relies on two distinct capacities: individuals must be able to 56 
evaluate the reputations of others as well as be able to strategically manage their own 57 
reputation. The cognition underpinning these two facets of reputation-based cooperation is 58 
likely to differ (Figure 1). Some evidence suggests that children begin to evaluate others on the 59 
basis of their prosociality from a very young age (reviewed in Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 60 
2008 but see Salvadori et al., 2015 for failed replication efforts). Evidence also exists in non-61 
human apes and other primates to suggest that individuals are able to evaluate and choose 62 
interaction partners on the basis of observed prosociality (Herrmann et al., 2013, Russell et al., 63 
2008, Subiaul et al., 2008, Kawai et al., 2019, but see Bueno-Guerra et al., 2020).  64 
 65 
In addition to evaluating others, humans also strategically manage their reputation by behaving 66 
more cooperatively when there is a possibility that other individuals will learn about their 67 
actions (see meta-analysis by Bradley et al., 2018). Observability increases cooperation in 68 
many domains, including tax compliance (Coricelli et al., 2010); voter turnout (Gerber et al., 69 
2008); energy conservation (Yoeli et al., 2013); environmentalism (Barclay & Barker, 2020); 70 
blood donation (Lacetera & Macis, 2010); and more. Most researchers interpret this increased 71 
cooperation as being caused by people’s concern for reputation.  72 
 73 
However, unlike the ability to evaluate others’ reputation, this tendency to strategically manage 74 
one’s own reputation is not present at all stages of life and instead appears to emerge during 75 
development. Although young children (under two years old) are known to behave prosocially 76 
(Dunfield et al., 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007; Vaish et al., 2009), such behaviour 77 
appears to stem from an intrinsic motivation to satisfy a partner’s needs rather from attempts 78 
to strategically manage reputation. Children begin to show a concern for reputation from the 79 
age of around five, for example by refraining from stealing from others if they are observed, 80 
or making more generous or fairer donations to recipients when their generosity will be 81 
revealed to others (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017; Leimgruber et al., 2012, McAuliffe et al., 82 
2020). Other work has shown that a concern with appearing to be prosocial or fair-minded 83 
increases over childhood (Shaw et al. 2014), and that children become especially concerned 84 
with self-presentation between the ages of 8 to 11 years old (Aloise-Young, 1993). At this age, 85 
children are increasingly able to inhibit behaviours that might result in social sanctions 86 
(Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Rutland et al., 2005) and attempt to present themselves in a positive 87 
light to others. At the same time, children become increasingly skeptical about the intentions 88 
of others, particularly when it comes to judging prosocial reputations (Heyman et al. 2014). 89 
Thus, it takes most of childhood for humans to hone their ability to understand how one’s 90 
actions affect our reputations and to behave strategically so as to curate a positive reputation.  91 
 92 
Unlike humans, there is scant evidence that non-humans primates attempt to strategically 93 
manage their reputation. One recent study found that capuchin monkeys were insensitive to the 94 
presence of an observer when deciding whether to share food (Schino et al., 2021), suggesting 95 
that capuchins do not attempt to strategically manage their reputation in this way. Studies in 96 
chimpanzees have also yielded null results. For instance, although chimpanzees increase effort 97 
in a resource acquisition task when watched by a potential competitor, they do not increase 98 
effort when watched by a potential cooperation partner (Engelmann et al., 2016). In the same 99 
task, four to-five-year-old children increased their efforts both in the presence of a competitive 100 
observer and in the presence of a potential future cooperation partner (Engelmann et al., 2016). 101 
Similarly, although five-year old children share more and steal less when observed by a peer, 102 
chimpanzees are not sensitive to the presence of an observer in the same paradigm (Engelmann, 103 
et al., 2012, see also Leimgruber et al., 2012, see also Nettle et al., 2013). 104 
 105 
The findings above suggest that (1) cognitive strategies needed for reputation-based 106 
cooperation differ depending on whether we consider evaluation of partners versus managing 107 
one’s own reputation and (2) that managing one’s own reputation is likely to depend upon more 108 
sophisticated socio-cognitive mechanisms. In what follows, we present four socio-cognitive 109 
candidates that may frequently be involved in reputation-based cooperation. Most 110 
fundamentally, we propose that an extensive working memory is key to developing the 111 
sophisticated forms of reputation management seen in humans. Three additional socio-112 
cognitive abilities derive from working memory that are likely to be involved in reputation-113 
based cooperation. These abilities are: (i) delaying gratification (ii) understanding others' 114 
mental states; and (iii) following and enforcing social norms. We show how these building 115 
blocks recruit working memory and how they may impinge upon reputation-based cooperation 116 
– as well as distinguishing between the cognition needed for evaluating others’ reputations and 117 
managing one’s own reputation, respectively (Figure 1).  118 
 119 
3. Cognitive mechanisms supporting reputation-based cooperation 120 
3.1.Working memory 121 
 122 
Following Fuster (2001), we define working memory as “a mechanism of temporal 123 
integration”. Crucially, working memory is not synonymous with short-term memory (STM) 124 
but rather emphasises both the reactivation of long-term stored information and the integration 125 
of new inputs, both of which are likely to be involved in dynamically evaluating and managing 126 
reputation. Working memory can be metaphorically likened to a workstation, a place where 127 
information is temporarily held and manipulated. Working memory is engaged whenever 128 
sophisticated socio-cognitive calculations are needed, such as appreciating that our own 129 
perspectives, beliefs and intentions can differ from those of other individuals, and 130 
understanding that an individual’s intentions might not be accurately represented by his 131 
actions. 132 
 133 
The ability to successfully manage one’s own reputation might often require individuals to 134 
monitor how they appear to others. Such monitoring requires the ability to entertain multiple 135 
perspectives simultaneously, which makes burdensome demands of working memory 136 
(Manrique & Walker, 2017). Successfully managing one’s own reputation might also involve 137 
mental time travel, which allows individuals to imagine how events might unfold in the future. 138 
This ability is also likely to involve working memory (Dere et al., 2019). Working memory is 139 
also likely to be involved in evaluating the reputations of others, for example by tracking 140 
cooperative behaviours (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998) and recalling what happened, with whom 141 
and when (‘episodic memory’). The complexity of such tasks can be increased further when 142 
individuals compare observed behaviours against normative standards, or against behaviours 143 
adopted by other individuals. The all-round utility of working memory poses some intriguing 144 
questions for developmental and evolutionary psychology: at what age does children’s working 145 
memory become capable of maintaining reputation-based cooperative systems? Do great apes 146 
have working memory complex enough to sustain reputation-based cooperative systems? By 147 
what processes might these abilities have evolved in humans? 148 
 149 
Working memory increases linearly between ages ~7 months and 14 years (Diamond & Doar, 150 
1989; Gathercole et al., 2004, Read, 2008). Meta-analytic evidence (Read, 2008) suggests that 151 
6-year-olds have a working memory size of three (compared to seven in adults: Miller, 1956). 152 
Three is the minimum working memory size required to command relative clauses in sentences, 153 
which are complex recursive structures like those used to tracking other people’s perspectives 154 
(e.g. John thinks that Mary knows he is supportive). Given that many reputational acts require 155 
such recursion (e.g., John knows that if he doesn’t help Mary now, she will not trust him to 156 
reciprocate), it is reasonable to regard three as the minimum working memory size required for 157 
constructing complex reputation-based cooperative systems. The extent of working memory 158 
involvement in evaluation of others’ reputations is likely to depend: evaluations that don’t 159 
involve recursion (e.g., helping that signals physical ability) may need less working memory 160 
than those which do (e.g., helping that signals future intent to cooperate).  161 
 162 
Studies directly measuring working memory in great apes are few and have yielded mixed 163 
results. Some studies suggest that the working memory capacity of non-human apes is likely 164 
to be limited. For instance, in a simplified version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, that 165 
involves sorting cards along three dimensions (shape, colour, number), chimpanzees struggled 166 
to form a classificatory criterion or to change it flexibly to match the reinforcement 167 
contingencies (Moriguchi et al., 2011). Similarly, in a memory task where individuals had to 168 
turn over cards one at a time and find matching pairs, chimpanzees made four times more 169 
mistakes than humans when tasked with three pairs, which would involve holding three cards 170 
in working memory (Washburn et al., 2007). Nevertheless, other studies have reported 171 
remarkable performance in serial ordering tasks administered to chimpanzees, that involved 172 
memorizing up to 5 digits flashed on a screen in ascending order (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007), 173 
or presenting up to 6 closed boxes on a platform and having a subject chimpanzee encode and 174 
remember those boxes already emptied of food in previous trials to avoid re-opening them 175 
again (Völter et al., 2019).  176 
 177 
An alternative approach to assessing working memory capacity involves measuring the extent 178 
to which individuals are able to hierarchically classify objects (Langer, 1980, 1986, 2000). The 179 
Langer protocol investigates spontaneous grouping of objects and allows performance to be 180 
rated as a function of complexity, ranging from first-order classifications, where only a single 181 
group of objects matching in shape and/or colour is formed (e.g. is set apart from the other 182 
objects), to classifications in which more than one group is formed contemporaneously (e.g. 183 
rings are grouped together and kept apart from the cubes). Second- (and higher) order 184 
classifications are assigned to groups of objects that are perceptually different, yet share the 185 
same classificatory criteria. Second- (and higher) order classification impose higher working 186 
memory demands on the classificatory rule as well as on the elements to be sorted, as their 187 
differing features need to be compared simultaneously and flexibly (Langer, 1980, 1986, 2000). 188 
Chimpanzees attain second-order combinativity around age 5 (Potì et al., 1999; Spinozzi et al., 189 
1999) when still they rarely compose more than two sets at a time (Langer, 2000, p.225). In 190 
contrast, toddlers begin developing three-category classifications around age 3. Three-category 191 
classification allows children to hierarchize – such as two subordinate classes within one 192 
superordinate class – whereas two-category classification does not (Langer, 2000). This 193 
hierarchization indicates that children develop recursive structures that might help them 194 
tracking other people’s perspectives and construct social reputation-based cooperative systems.  195 
 196 
Other approaches have inferred working memory size based on the increasing complexity of 197 
manufactured stone tools in the fossil record. Making and using simple stone flakes is reported 198 
from Late Pliocene Africa 3,4 MYA, where bipedal Australopithecine existed from before 4 199 
MYA. Australopithecines gave rise to the genus Homo, perhaps as early as 2,8 MYA, with 200 
which they coexisted until after 2 MYA. By 2,5 MYA there are several Palaeolithic 201 
assemblages of sharp conchoidal (i.e., shell-shaped) flakes struck by manual percussion with 202 
hard hammer-stones. Conchoidal fracturing requires simultaneously focusing on the core 203 
stone, the hammer stone, and the percussion angle, which implies a larger working memory 204 
than that required for simple flakes (Read & Van Der Leeuw, 2008). Homo predominated by 205 
1,76 MYA years ago, and co-occur in the African archaeological record with flattish stone 206 
handaxes. These handaxes often resembled a large almond, were formed by manual percussion 207 
with a hard hammer-stone that removed small conchoidal flakes in a regular manner (e.g. 208 
bifacial stone-tool fashioning), from two surfaces of the handaxe to be. By 0.4-0.3 MYA, 209 
handaxes had 3D symmetry, which required their makers to simultaneously remember different 210 
perspectives of the core being worked on. To achieve ideal symmetry involves advanced 211 
foresight and the ability to represent mentally the intended final product to exert on-going 212 
corrections on the working substrate. Based on the increasing complexity of stone tools, and 213 
the working memory required to make them, a reasonable conjecture is that early Homo had a 214 
working memory greater than that of Australopithecines, which was in turn that of 215 
chimpanzees. Taken together, these various lines of evidence suggest that working memory 216 
capacity is likely to be higher in humans than in non-human apes (and specifically 217 
chimpanzees).  218 
 219 
Although working memory capacity has been relatively understudied in other animals 220 
(Carruthers, 2013), there is some suggestive evidence for correlates of advanced working 221 
memory in some species. For example, scrub jays display evidence of episodic-like memory, 222 
being able to remember ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ during food caching events (Clayton & 223 
Dickinson, 1998) as well as flexibly altering their own caching strategies to avoid being 224 
parasitized by others (Correia et al., 2007). This example might provide the most compelling 225 
evidence for sophisticated working memory in non- primates. As such, if they would benefit 226 
from being able to choose partners for cooperative interactions, then they are a good species to 227 
test for reputation-based cooperative systems. 228 
 229 
3.2 Delay of Gratification  230 
 231 
Any form of costly cooperation based on investments requires the ability to resist the 232 
temptation to obtain immediate benefits (e.g. by cheating) in order to pursue a larger benefit in 233 
the future. In some cases, this problem may be solved by psychological mechanisms which 234 
render cooperative behaviour immediately subjectively rewarding (a phenomenon known as 235 
warm glow, Andreoni, 1990). In other cases, individuals may have to effortfully resist an 236 
immediately higher-paying option: they must be able to delay gratification.  237 
 238 
Although people are systematically present-biased, the human ability to think long-term is 239 
extraordinary in nature (Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf, 2013). Human consciousness can produce 240 
mental simulations of possible futures, allowing decisions to be based on anticipated outcomes 241 
(Baumeister et al., 2018). Indeed, a large part of humans' mental processes seems to be 242 
prospective (Seligman et al., 2013), focusing on what ought to be done in the here and now in 243 
order to produce positive results in the future (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007).  244 
 245 
Investing in a prosocial reputation might sometimes require the ability to delay gratification, 246 
because the rewards for cooperation come from future (potentially unknown) partners instead 247 
of one’s current partner and are therefore inherently more likely to be delayed and less certain 248 
to materialise. Several lines of evidence link the ability to delay gratification with cooperative 249 
tendency in humans. Focusing on the future makes participants more generous (Sjåstad, 2019), 250 
and spurs their willingness to incur personal costs to prevent damaging reputational 251 
information from spreading (Vonasch et al., 2018). Children’s ability to delay gratification is 252 
positively related to their tendency to share, indicating that the ability to delay gratification 253 
might be a prerequisite for children’s sharing and cooperation (Sebastián-Enesco & Warneken, 254 
2015). Similar patterns have been observed in adults (Curry et al., 2008; Harris & Madden, 255 
2002; though see Barclay & Barker, 2020; Wu et al., 2017), as well as in blue jays who are 256 
prevented from consuming rewards immediately (Stephens et al., 2002). Children are also 257 
better at delaying gratification in cooperative tasks than solo tasks (Koomen et al., 2020). A 258 
direct link between delay of gratification and reputational management has been suggested in 259 
3- and 4-year-old children (Ma et al., 2020), although other work has shown that people are 260 
unable to anticipate the delayed indirect benefits from their own cooperative investments (Wu 261 
et al., 2016). To the extent that delay of gratification is involved in reputation-based 262 
cooperation, we expect it to be more important in reputation management than in evaluating 263 
the reputations of others (see Fig. 1).  264 
 265 
In humans, the ability to delay gratification is measured using paradigms such as the 266 
‘marshmallow test’ (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970), which measures the willingness to forego a 267 
smaller, immediate reward when a larger, delayed reward is promised. Performance on such 268 
tasks is variable - and the strategies children use to resist temptation suggest the importance of 269 
two different cognitive systems (“automatic” vs “top-down”) that affect self-control (Luerssen 270 
et al., 2015; Hare et al., 2009). By the age of six, children become aware that putting the 271 
rewards out of sight during the delay interval helps them to withhold and wait longer (Mischel 272 
& Mischel, 1983). By the age of 12, children realise that not only seeing the food influences 273 
their performance, but also the way they talk about it – demonstrating the role of metacognition 274 
on performance in such settings. Qualitatively similar results have been observed in 275 
chimpanzees. In experimental settings, chimpanzees can delay gratification for up to 10 276 
minutes (Beran & Evans, 2006), and seem to use similar strategies to human children to 277 
increase performance on these tasks. For example, chimpanzees engage in more play when 278 
higher self-restraint is needed in order to gain bigger rewards - suggesting that they are 279 
intentionally deploying strategies to increase their performance (Evans & Beran, 2007).  280 
 281 
The delay-of-gratification test has by now been used on a variety of vertebrate species (Miller 282 
et al., 2019; Susini et al., 2020; Aellen et al., 2021) with varying results. Dogs (with their 283 
owners) as well as some fish and large-brained monkeys (macaques and capuchins) are all able 284 
to wait for extended periods to obtain larger rewards; cuttlefish have also been reported to wait 285 
up to two minutes (Schnell et al., 2021). By contrast, small monkeys, rats and various birds 286 
(pigeons, corvids, parrots) perform poorly in such tasks. Nevertheless, apart from dogs and 287 
chimpanzees, individuals of high performing species typically only wait 30-60 seconds for a 288 
larger amount or a preferred food, which offers a stark contrast with the circa 30 minutes 289 
reported in human children (Luerssen et al., 2015) in similar tasks – and the potential to delay 290 
gratification for much longer periods in adulthood. This reduced delay of gratification in other 291 
species may limit their ability to perform reputation-based cooperation.  292 
 293 
3.3 Theory of Mind  294 
Theory of mind is a multifaceted concept that refers to the ability to attribute mental states to 295 
oneself and to third-parties and encompasses different abilities, which vary in computational 296 
complexity. For example, taking another individual’s visual perspective is simpler than 297 
attributing intentions, which is in turn simpler than attributing knowledge, which is again 298 
simpler than understanding complex perspectives (level 2 perspective-taking) or attributing 299 
beliefs. These latter two examples of theory of mind are extremely taxing in terms of 300 
computational demands, because they involve entertaining simultaneously alternative, often 301 
contradictory, representations of reality (for a more detailed explanation, see Manrique & 302 
Walker, 2017).  303 
 304 
Here we introduce two theory of mind abilities that are likely to be involved in reputation 305 
management and evaluating the reputation of others: perspective-taking and attribution of 306 
intentions. Reputation-based cooperation may be more stable against erosion if bystanders or 307 
other third parties can correctly attribute intentions and beliefs to actors, and if actors can 308 
represent how they and their actions are perceived in the eyes of others. For example, an 309 
individual may fail to cooperate either because (s)he does not realise that a recipient needs 310 
help, or because (s)he currently lacks the resources to help. In other words, individuals with a 311 
willingness to help may sometimes behave uncooperatively. If bystanders can correctly 312 
identify uncooperative behaviour as a mistake or temporary inability, they can continue a 313 
cooperative relationship with those who didn’t intend to defect. Therefore, the reputation 314 
system becomes less prone to errors undermining cooperation.  315 
 316 
Errors are particularly problematic in indirect reciprocity models of cooperation. Indirect 317 
reciprocity is only stable if agents distinguish between justified defections and unjustified 318 
defections (i.e., defecting on defectors vs. defecting on cooperators; “Kandori” or “standing” 319 
strategies, Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007). However, such systems are undermined by 320 
errors because they can cause two individuals to perceive the same situation differently. Under 321 
the Kandori strategy, an actor’s reputation improves if (s)he either helps a partner in good 322 
standing or refuses to help a partner in bad standing. Conversely, an actor’s reputation 323 
decreases if (s)he fails to help someone in good standing or helps someone in bad standing. 324 
Thus, if actors and bystanders evaluate a potential recipient’s reputation differently, bystanders 325 
will alter the actor’s reputation score in the opposite direction as the actor (or others) would 326 
have expected. Under the Kandori strategy, low frequencies of any type of error may therefore 327 
erode cooperation (Milinski et al., 2001). Perspective taking (and more broadly theory of mind) 328 
are crucial to overcome the limitations of Kandori, as players may acknowledge the possibility 329 
of missing information leading to the ‘wrong’ behaviour or the ‘wrong’ interpretation. 330 
 331 
By contrast, reputation-based partner choice can function with or without theory of mind. In 332 
reputation-based partner choice, actors help others to signal their ability and/or willingness to 333 
help (Barclay, 2013). Theory of mind is not necessary to signal one’s abilities or to interpret 334 
such signals: when people see a good hunter share his kill, they can infer that (s)he is physically 335 
skilled enough to catch it (e.g., Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000) without knowing anything of his 336 
or her mental state. Hunters needn’t know anything about the audience’s mental state either – 337 
they can learn that certain behaviours are rewarded (e.g., being chosen as a partner) via 338 
reinforcement learning. However, theory of mind can greatly aid reputation-based partner 339 
choice because it allows for more complex or targeted signals. For example, theory of mind 340 
allows audiences to infer a helper’s intentions in order to predict future cooperation and thus 341 
allows individuals to signal not just their ability but their willingness to help. Therefore, 342 
although simple forms of reputation-based partner choice might be achieved without the 343 
advanced socio-cognitive mechanisms we discuss in this paper, we note that reputation-based 344 
partner choice can later evolve to become cognitively quite complex, particularly when helpful 345 
individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their type to others and when receivers take 346 
hidden intentions of partners into consideration when evaluating prosocial acts (see Raihani & 347 
Power, 2021 for a detailed discussion). 348 
 349 
3.3.1 Perspective-taking 350 
 351 
Perspective-taking can be broadly described as the ability to adopt the perspective of others 352 
(e.g. visual, informational, emotional). At around two years of age, children are able to 353 
differentiate what people can or cannot see (Moll & Tomasello, 2006). However, it is usually 354 
not until three to four years of age that children understand that the same item can look different 355 
from different perspectives (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011). This ability (level 2 perspective-taking) 356 
requires effortful control to suppress the child's own visual perception, and is often viewed as 357 
the precursor to full-blown theory of mind, in which the individual gains the ability to 358 
understand others' knowledge and beliefs.  359 
 360 
Perspective-taking is likely to be involved in both reputation management and the evaluation 361 
of others’ reputations. Reputation management involves not only behaving in a certain way, 362 
but also the ability to shift perspectives to represent how complying or failing to act in this 363 
manner will be perceived by others (Fig. 1). Thus, taking others’ perspectives can make an 364 
organism much more effective at reputation management. Similarly, perspective-taking makes 365 
an organism better at detecting cheaters: organisms may dishonestly present themselves as 366 
cooperative, and it requires cognitive effort for observers to distinguish between genuine versus 367 
deceptive cooperators. For example, one individual might normally be a “cheater”, but might 368 
temporarily act cooperatively when (s)he sees someone (s)he wants to deceive or impress (e.g., 369 
a potential mate). Detecting dishonesty involves being able to entertain simultaneously 370 
differing views of reality, an ability that can be equated in terms of computational complexity 371 
to attributing complex (level 2) visual perspective. Hence, even if perspective-taking is not 372 
strictly required to evaluate other’s reputation, managing level 2 visual perspective-taking 373 
indicates that organisms have the cognitive potential to entertain simultaneously 374 
differing/contrasting views of reality (mine vs yours), and hence the ability to representing 375 
simultaneously overt and hidden intentions in other’s actions. 376 
  377 
Perspective taking covers a wide spectrum of abilities, from knowing what others can or cannot 378 
see (‘level 1’) to understanding that others see something differently as a function of their 379 
relative position (‘level 2’) (Flavell, 1977; Flavell et al., 1981) and is therefore a good proxy 380 
of other mentalising skills. Level 1 perspective-taking has been extensively investigated in 381 
chimpanzees with initially diverging results (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996; Hare et al., 2000). Karg 382 
et al. (2015) used a variation of the experience projection paradigm (Heyes, 1998) where 383 
chimpanzees were trained with different pairs of goggles that affected what they could see. 384 
When wearing one colour, the apes could see through the goggles but when wearing the other 385 
colour they could not see anything. It could be inferred that chimpanzees are able to shift 386 
perspectives if their own experience with the goggles (i.e., seeing vs. not seeing) affected their 387 
response to human experimenters wearing the goggles. However, in this study, chimpanzees' 388 
gaze-following was not influenced by their own previous experience with the googles (Karg et 389 
al. 2015). Subsequent results indicated that chimpanzees may be able to shift perspectives in a 390 
competitive context yet correct visual perspective attribution only approached a modest 60% 391 
(Karg et al. 2015; but see Okamoto-Barth et al., 2007 for more positive findings). 392 
Demonstrating level 2 visual perspective-taking in chimpanzees still proves elusive (Karg et 393 
al., 2016). 394 
 395 
Outside apes, the basic forms of perspective taking have currently only been found in large-396 
brained species. For example, rhesus monkeys steal more often from a human competitor 397 
whose face is hidden by an opaque barrier than a competitor whose body alone is hidden 398 
(Flombaum & Santos, 2005). Capuchin monkeys can also strategically conceal visual 399 
information (Flombaum & Santos, 2005), while macaques have been reported to know what 400 
others can or cannot hear (Santos et al., 2006). Ravens provide the best evidence for perspective 401 
taking in birds, being able to follow human gaze direction around obstacles (Bugnyar et al., 402 
2004) and attributing visual perspectives even to unseen competitors (Bugnyar et al., 2016). 403 
Most recently, however, there is evidence that cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus females are 404 
able to choose foraging sites where their male partners cannot observe them (McAuliffe et al., 405 
in review). Altogether, it appears that some other species may have some perspective-taking 406 
abilities which can aid reputation-based cooperation, but perhaps not to the same level as 407 
humans. 408 
 409 
3.3.2 Attributing intentions 410 
Having a good or bad reputation is not simply the consequence of performing good or bad 411 
deeds; the intention behind observed actions matters (although the tendency to take intentions 412 
into consideration when forming moral judgements varies across cultures, Barrett et al., 2016). 413 
Notwithstanding this cross-cultural variability, attributing intentionality is another skill that is 414 
key to evaluating third-party reputations (Fig.1).  415 
 416 
As early as 14 months, infants selectively copy actions performed intentionally, as opposed to 417 
those that seem fortuitous (Meltzoff, 1995). Similarly, Gergely et al. (2002) showed that 14-418 
month-old children imitate unusual actions (e.g., turning on a light with one’s forehead) more 419 
often if those actions were voluntary than if the actions were necessary (e.g., the model’s hands 420 
were full, thus necessitating use of their forehead). Nine to eighteen months-old toddlers show 421 
more patience towards adults who try but fail to hand them a toy than towards teasing adults 422 
(i.e., seem unwilling) (Behne et al., 2005). Similarly, 21-month-old children are more willing 423 
to help other children who had attempted but failed to hand them a toy in previous interactions, 424 
than to those who previously refused to offer the toy (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010). Therefore, 425 
it appears children at a very early age can differentiate outcomes from intentions when judging 426 
others’ behaviour.  427 
 428 
Other animals also appear capable of attributing intentions. In one study (Call & Tomasello, 429 
1998), chimpanzees and orangutans preferentially selected boxes that were deliberately marked 430 
as containing rewards, more so than boxes that were accidentally marked by the experimenter. 431 
Similar attempts at gauging intention attribution in other nonhuman primates have met with 432 
mixed results: positive in cotton-top tamarins and rhesus macaques (Wood et al., 2007); 433 
negative in chimpanzees (Povinelli et al., 1998), Tonkean macaques and tufted capuchin 434 
monkeys (Costes-Thiré et al., 2015). Call et al. (2004) showed that chimpanzees leave a testing 435 
area sooner when confronted with an experimenter who was unwilling to give them food (e.g. 436 
a teasing human who took away the food) as opposed to one who was unable to do so. This 437 
paradigm has yielded similar results in capuchins and Tonkean macaques (Canteloup et al., 438 
2016; Phillips et al., 2009). Some non-primates also seem able to consider both the intentions 439 
and the outcomes of performed actions: grey parrots (Péron et al., 2010) and even horses 440 
(Trösch et al., 2020) behave differently when confronted with an unwilling versus an unable 441 
experimenter offering food rewards. 442 
 443 
Some intentions are simple and clear, or are even broadcasted, whereas other intentions are 444 
hidden – organisms may deliberately hide their intentions in order to trick others. Whereas non-445 
humans may be capable of attributing simple intentions, we think that the ability to represent 446 
hidden intentions might be restricted to humans because it might require a full-blown theory 447 
of mind, a powerful working memory for simultaneously representing multiple realities or 448 
perspectives (Manrique & Walker, 2017), and possibly even the existence of language for 449 
representing knowledge propositionally. 450 
 451 
3.4 The use of normative rules  452 
 453 
The use of norms is a potential key complement to the socio-cognitive abilities discussed in 454 
the previous section. Normative/moral understanding is likely to be involved in managing own 455 
reputation and in evaluating others’ reputations (Fig. 1). To have a good reputation, individuals 456 
must comply with some norms or moral standards and check that their behaviour aligns with 457 
those norms. The same goes for judging others’ reputations, as individuals must contrast a 458 
potential partner’s behaviour with the very same normative/moral standards. If humans did not 459 
possess an awareness of what the “right” behaviour is, it would become harder to choose 460 
partners based on whether they do the “right” thing.  In indirect reciprocity models, the strong 461 
standing strategy makes a clear distinction between what is right and what is wrong, based on 462 
the standing of the recipient (Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007). This can only work if 463 
all players converge on a specific norm that defines who is worthy of help, and who is unworthy 464 
of help. Thus, indirect reciprocity systems require a species to be able to use norms. In contrast, 465 
reputation-based partner choice can function without norms (e.g., if third parties only assess 466 
the actor’s ability to help). That being said, reputation-based partner choice might also be 467 
affected by norms: the same helpful act may be seen as generous if the norm is to help less, or 468 
stingy if the norm is to help more (Barclay, 2013). It might be advantageous to compare 469 
potential partners to the norm to know whom to choose (McNamara et al., 2008), or to compare 470 
oneself to the norm and adjust one’s own cooperation up or down accordingly (Barclay, 2013, 471 
2016).  472 
 473 
Human infants are born into a world filled with social norms. Throughout infancy, children 474 
learn how things are done and not done. By the age of around two, children can follow adults’ 475 
requests and conform to others' social behaviours (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). At around the 476 
age of three, children can infer norms by observing others acting in a certain way without 477 
needing adult directives. At the same time, they also start enforcing norms on others (Vaish et 478 
al., 2011).  By around five years of age, children reach another milestone of normative 479 
development: the spontaneous creation of their own rules (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017). 480 
Although cultural norms vary widely in their content and implementation, children all over the 481 
world show similar abilities for understanding, following, and enforcing socially prescribed 482 
behaviours (Miller, 2007). The ways in which children create and deal with norms suggests a 483 
growing understanding that norms are mutual agreements which result in rights and obligations 484 
for each individual involved. Interestingly, children's concern about their own reputation (and 485 
attempts at actively managing it) seems to trail their normative development (Kelsey et al., 486 
2018; Engelmann et al., 2012), i.e., children’s reputation management develops after their 487 
ability to view norms as a mutually-agreed upon standards for collaborative interactions.  488 
 489 
If normative development encompasses the ability to view norms as a set of standards for 490 
interactions, then it can only originate in species where collaborative interactions are initiated 491 
by joint agency. Given the lack of evidence for shared agency and intentionality in 492 
chimpanzees, the existence of a social system based on collective norms and influenced by 493 
reputation seems highly unlikely (Schmidt, & Rakoczy, 2019; Tomasello, 2019). Also, given 494 
the sparse evidence for social norms in chimpanzees, it is unsurprising that there is little 495 
evidence for norms in other species either. In both vervet monkeys and great tits, there is 496 
evidence that migrating individuals may give up previously learned preferences and conform 497 
to local arbitrary preferences (van de Waal et al., 2013; Aplin et al., 2015). If such conformity 498 
did represent norm-following, then these species might theoretically be capable of cooperative 499 
systems based on social norms. Without such norm-following, the evolution of reputation-500 
based cooperation is less likely or less efficient.  501 
 502 
4. Reputation-based cooperation in non-human species 503 
 504 
Although cognitive constraints may prevent many non-human species from displaying 505 
complex forms of reputation-based cooperation (Izuma, 2012), they may have simpler forms 506 
that are less cognitively demanding. In social species, individuals often interact in 507 
communication networks, where bystanders may eavesdrop on interactions to extract valuable 508 
information (McGregor, 2005). Therefore, acting in a communication network has three 509 
potential payoff consequences: the payoff obtained from the current interaction, the effect of 510 
one’s own action on the partner’s future behaviour towards self, and the effect of one’s own 511 
action on the future behaviour of any bystander that learns about the action. Interactions in a 512 
communication network therefore allow individuals to identify potentially cooperative or 513 
aggressive individuals in their social environment and to adjust their behaviour appropriately. 514 
Moreover, the possibility for bystander responsiveness might incentivise individuals to adjust 515 
their current behaviour when they are observed, a phenomenon known as ‘audience effects’ 516 
(Matos & Schlupp, 2005). This concept shares features with reputation management in 517 
humans.  518 
 519 
While eavesdropping and audience effects are widespread among vertebrates and have even 520 
been documented in invertebrates, convincing evidence exists primarily in competitive 521 
contexts (McGregor, 2005). By contrast, in species other than our own, there is a paucity of 522 
evidence demonstrating that individuals show a concern for gaining a prosocial reputation. 523 
Various arguments can be made why signals are likely to be honest in a competitive context 524 
(Arnott & Elwood, 2009; Johnstone & Bshary, 2004) but less reliable in a cooperative context 525 
(Johnstone & Bshary, 2007; Barclay, 2013; André, 2010; Bebbington et al., 2017). In a 526 
competitive context, individual aggressiveness is likely to be correlated with strength, which 527 
is based on metastable features like size, muscle mass, agility and experience. Therefore, 528 
signals of formability are difficult to fake and more likely to be honest. The honesty of such 529 
signals can change the benefits associated with paying attention to them: eavesdropping in 530 
order to gain information on a potential partner’s formidability is potentially self-serving. In 531 
return, strong individuals may benefit from signaling their strength to eavesdropping 532 
bystanders, for example by displaying after a victorious fight, or attacking those lower in the 533 
hierarchy after a defeat (Kazim & Aureli, 2005) in order to reduce the likelihood of being the 534 
target of future challenges. Strong individuals may even pick a fight that yields a short-term 535 
negative payoff to reduce the likelihood of being challenged by bystanders in the future 536 
(Johnstone & Bshary, 2004).  537 
 538 
Nevertheless, there are a handful of examples from non-human species that are suggestive of 539 
reputation-based cooperation. In various species, individuals may temporarily act as a 540 
watchman by looking out for predators while the rest of the group forages. While such 541 
behaviour has been interpreted as immediately self-serving as it is mostly done by satiated 542 
individuals (Clutton-Brock et al., 1999), experiments involving dwarf mongooses have shown 543 
that playbacks of an individual’s watchman calls increases the amount of grooming this 544 
individual receives later in the day (Kern & Radford, 2018). In vervet monkeys, males and 545 
females that contribute during territorial disputes receive more grooming by other group 546 
members (Arseneau-Robar et al., 2016). In Arabian babblers and Siberian jays, males act more 547 
aggressively towards predators in the presence of females, which is suggestive of males 548 
displaying in the context of female mate choice (Zahavi, 1995; da Cunha et al., 2017). In all 549 
these cases, there is no specific recipient of the initial helpful act, meaning that the source of 550 
eventual return benefits is uncertain.  551 
 552 
Perhaps the best studied case is the marine cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner wrasse 553 
Labroides dimidiatus and its ‘client’ fish. Cleaners remove ectoparasites from clients, which 554 
benefits both partners (Côté, 2000). However, cleaners prefer to eat client mucus (Grutter & 555 
Bshary, 2003), which is detrimental to client health and hence constitutes cheating. As cleaners 556 
have about 2000 interactions per day (Grutter, 1995), ongoing interactions often take place in 557 
the presence of other clients. These bystanders observe the ongoing interaction and invite for 558 
inspection if the cleaner behaves cooperatively - but leave if they witness a conflict between 559 
cleaner and current client (Bshary, 2002), and may swim to another cleaner instead. As a 560 
consequence of this client decision rule, cleaners are more cooperative in the presence of 561 
bystanders (Bshary & Grutter, 2006; Pinto et al., 2011). Moreover, cleaners stop adjusting 562 
service quality if bystanders stop exerting such partner choice (Triki et al., 2018, 2020).  563 
 564 
Some features of the cleaner-client interaction structure might facilitate reputation-based 565 
cooperation. First, memory requirements are minimal: bystanders need only consider the 566 
currently observed interaction to make an immediate decision whether to invite or to avoid 567 
inspection. Second, the bystander’s decision is self-serving as there is short-term 568 
autocorrelation of cleaner service quality; and the clients get immediate feedback on their 569 
decisions, which facilitates learning (Skinner, 1953). Cleaners who feed against preference 570 
must delay immediate gratification, but the positive or negative feedback of this decision 571 
(clients inviting for inspection or swimming away) is almost immediate, which also facilitates 572 
learning. Thus, basic reinforcement learning might suffice to achieve reputation-based 573 
cooperation in this system. 574 
 575 
One obvious distinction between reputation-based cooperation in humans and other animals is 576 
that humans use language (see other contributions to this theme issue). Language allows people 577 
to flexibly exchange information about other individuals (Wu et al., 2016) – and can potentially 578 
also increase the amount of information that can be exchanged. Language can also help humans 579 
to represent (and hence encode) and recall social norms and might also be a pre-requisite for 580 
expressing more complex aspects of social cognition that are likely to be involved in managing 581 
and evaluating reputations. Despite its likely importance, we do not discuss language in this 582 
review, because it acts more as a multiplier on other cognitive mechanisms, and we instead 583 
focus on other proximate cognitive mechanisms that form the basic building blocks of 584 
reputation-based cooperation in humans. 585 
 586 
5. Discussion  587 
We have presented four basic psychological building blocks that we consider important 588 
facilitators for complex reputation-based cooperation: working memory, delay of gratification, 589 
theory of mind, and social norms. Working memory allows for parallel processing of diverse 590 
information, to properly assess others’ actions and update their reputation scores. Delay of 591 
gratification is useful for many types of cooperation, but may be particularly relevant for 592 
reputation-based cooperation where the returns come from a future interaction with an observer 593 
rather than an immediate reciprocation by one’s current partner. Theory of mind makes it easier 594 
to properly assess others’ actions, and reduces the risk that spreading errors will undermine 595 
cooperation. Finally, norms support theory of mind by giving individuals a benchmark of what 596 
is right or wrong.  The more developed that each of these building blocks is, the more complex 597 
the interaction structure can become. We are aware that by picking these four socio-cognitive 598 
mechanisms we leave out other processes that might be involved, e.g. long-term memory, yet 599 
we think the ones we picked are more critical and better allow for comparison across species.  600 
 601 
Reputation-based cooperation based on partner choice might often be less cognitively 602 
demanding than that based on indirect reciprocity. On the one hand, reputation-based partner 603 
choice might require a better ability to delay gratification (as it might take several acts of 604 
investment to outcompete competitors and be chosen by third parties), while IR games are 605 
typically set up in such a way that individuals alternate roles as helper and recipient. On the 606 
other hand, reputation-based partner choice can exist in cognitively simple forms like “walk 607 
away or reject partner if they seem uncooperative” (Aktipis, 2004; McNamara et al., 2008); 608 
this does not require high working memory, theory of mind, or normative behaviour, though 609 
these abilities can make reputation-based partner choice more efficient. In contrast, analyses 610 
of indirect reciprocity games have shown that Kandori is the simplest strategy yielding stable 611 
cooperation (Santos et al., 2018), and Kandori requires norms, theory of mind to identify errors, 612 
and as a consequence more computational power (e.g. working memory). Therefore, the vast 613 
majority of animal species may be cognitively constrained from implementing indirect 614 
reciprocity, and hence be limited to simple forms of reputation-based partner choice. In line 615 
with this hypothesis, the few non-human examples of reputation-based cooperation largely fit 616 
the concept of reputation-based partner choice, not indirect reciprocity. Most of the examples 617 
seem to be about one party gaining information about another, to know whom to cooperate or 618 
mate with, or whom to avoid in fights – a type of reputation-based partner choice based on 619 
eavesdropping (McGregor, 2005). As such, there is a clear evolutionary path for reputation-620 
based partner choice: start with cognitively simple eavesdropping, which then evolves into an 621 
active signalling system (see Biernaskie et al., 2018 for cues evolving into signals), with more 622 
complex abilities arising later in both signallers and receivers in order to perform better within 623 
that signalling system. 624 
 625 
Future work should further clarify the role of these cognitive mechanisms in reputation-based 626 
cooperation in both humans and non-humans. Studies could investigate reputation-based 627 
cooperation in humans when these cognitive mechanisms cannot function properly, such as 628 
experimental paradigms that increase cognitive load (e.g., Milinski & Wedekind, 1998), special 629 
populations that lack some of these cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Cage et al., 2013; Izuma et al., 630 
2011), or online networks where one cannot use these mechanisms. Non-human studies could 631 
artificially grant these abilities to non-humans, for example by dissociating cooperative 632 
investments from ability to delay gratification (c.f. Stephens et al., 2002). Other studies could 633 
use other creative ways of outsourcing cognition to see how they affect reputation-based 634 
cooperation.  We look forward to seeing further tests of the cognitive building blocks of 635 





Figure 1. Depiction of how our four socio-cognitive mechanisms are recruited for the 641 
managing of one’s own reputation as opposed to evaluating third-party reputations. No 642 
connecting lines indicate there is no need for the socio-cognitive mechanism in question to be 643 
recruited. Arrow continuity expresses the activation of the mechanism is heavily involved in 644 
reputation management and/or evaluation. Dotted lines indicate minor involvement. For 645 
instance, perspective taking is key to managing one’s own reputation, as we need to see how 646 
our acts will appear to a putative observer, yet perspective taking matters less for evaluating 647 
third-party reputations. The opposite is true for attributing intentions. Delay of gratification 648 
might be involved in managing one’s own reputation as it allows one to resist current 649 
temptations to exploit an interaction partner in order to obtain higher future payoffs 650 
associated with curating a good reputation. We expect delay of gratification to be less 651 
important for evaluating third-party reputations. Normative understanding is involved in both 652 
managing of one’s own reputation and evaluating third-party reputations. Working memory 653 
is placed in a different level because it enhances the other psychological processes and 654 
greatly boosts their efficiency. While working memory is highly involved in delaying 655 
gratification, adopting the other’s perspective, and attributing intentions, its involvement in 656 
moral evaluation is lower as norms are stored in long-term memory.  657 
 658 
 659 
References  660 
 661 
Aellen, M., Dufour, V., & Bshary, R. (2021). Cleaner fish and other wrasse match primates 662 
in their ability to delay gratification. Animal Behaviour, 176, 125-143. 663 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2021.04.002 664 
 665 
Aktipis, C. A. (2004). Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of 666 
cooperation. Journal of theoretical biology, 231(2), 249-260. 667 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020 668 
 669 
André, J.-B. (2010). The evolution of reciprocity: social types or social incentives? The 670 
American Naturalist, 175(2), 197-210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/649597 671 
 672 
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow 673 
giving. The economic journal, 100(401), 464-477. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234133 674 
 675 
Aloise-Young, P. A. (1993). The development of self-presentation: Self-promotion in 6-to 676 
10-year-old children. Social Cognition, 11(2), 201-222. 677 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.1993.11.2.201 678 
 679 
Apfelbaum, E. P., Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Seeing race and seeming racist? 680 
Evaluating strategic colorblindness in social interaction. Journal of personality and social 681 
psychology, 95(4), 918-932. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0011990 682 
 683 
Aplin, L. M., Farine, D. R., Morand-Ferron, J., Cockburn, A., Thornton, A., & Sheldon, B. C. 684 
(2015). Experimentally induced innovations lead to persistent culture via conformity in wild 685 
birds. Nature, 518(7540), 538-541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature13998 686 
 687 
Arnott, G., & Elwood, R. W. (2009). Assessment of fighting ability in animal contests. 688 
Animal Behaviour, 77(5), 991-1004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.02.010 689 
 690 
Arseneau-Robar, T. J. M., Taucher, A. L., Müller, E., van Schaik, C., Bshary, R., & Willems, 691 
E. P. (2016). Female monkeys use both the carrot and the stick to promote male participation 692 
in intergroup fights. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 283(1843), 693 
20161817. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.1817 694 
 695 
Barclay, P. (2013). Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans. 696 
Evolution & Human Behavior, 34(3), 164-175. 697 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002 698 
 699 
Barclay, P. (2015). Reputation. In D. Buss (Ed.) Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (2nd 700 
Ed.), pp. 810-828. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons. 701 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych233 702 
 703 
Barclay, P. (2016). Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation and 704 
friendship. Current Opinion in Psychology, 7, 33-38. 705 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.012 706 
 707 
Barclay, P., & Barker, J.L. (2020). Greener than thou: people who protect the environment 708 
are more cooperative, compete to be environmental, and benefit from reputation. Journal of 709 
Environmental Psychology, 72, 101441. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101441 710 
 711 
Barrett, H.C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A.N., Fessler, D.M.T., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M., 712 
Henrich, J., Kanovsky, M., Kushnick, G., Pisor, A., Scelza, B.A., Stich, S., von Rueden, C., 713 
Zhao, W., & Laurence, S. (2016). Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the 714 
role of intentions in moral judgement. Proceedings of the New York Academy of Sciences, 715 
113(17), 4688-4693. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1522070113 716 
 717 
Baumeister, R. F., Maranges, H. M., & Sjåstad, H. (2018). Consciousness of the future as a 718 
matrix of maybe: Pragmatic prospection and the simulation of alternative possibilities. 719 
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 5(3), 223–238.  720 
 721 
Bebbington, K., MacLeod, C., Ellison, T. M., & Fay, N. (2017). The sky is falling: evidence 722 
of a negativity bias in the social transmission of information. Evolution and Human Behavior, 723 
38(1), 92-101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.07.004 724 
 725 
Behne, T., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Unwilling versus unable: infants' 726 
understanding of intentional action. Developmental psychology, 41(2), 328-337. 727 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.41.2.328 728 
 729 
Beran, M. J., & Evans, T. A. (2006). Maintenance of delay of gratification by four 730 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): The effects of delayed reward visibility, experimenter 731 




Biernaskie, J. M., Perry, J. C., & Grafen, A. (2018). A general model of biological signals, 736 
from cues to handicaps. Evolution Letters, 2(3), 201-209. https://doi.org/10.1002/evl3.57 737 
 738 
Bradley, A., Lawrence, C., & Ferguson, E. (2018). Does observability affect prosociality? 739 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 285, 20180116. 740 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0116 741 
 742 
Bshary, R. (2002). Biting cleaner fish use altruism to deceive image–scoring client reef fish. 743 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 269(1505), 2087-744 
2093. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2002.2084 745 
 746 
Bshary, R., & Grutter, A. S. (2006). Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish 747 
mutualism. Nature, 441(7096), 975-978. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature04755 748 
 749 
Bueno-Guerra, N., Colell, M., & Call, J. (2020). Effects of indirect reputation and type of 750 
rearing on food choices in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Behavioral Ecology and 751 
Sociobiology, 74(6), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00265-020-02861-w 752 
 753 
Bugnyar, T., Reber, S. A., & Buckner, C. (2016). Ravens attribute visual access to unseen 754 
competitors. Nature Communications, 7(1), 1-6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10506 755 
 756 
Bugnyar, T., Stöwe, M., & Heinrich, B. (2004). Ravens, Corvus corax, follow gaze direction 757 
of humans around obstacles. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: 758 
Biological Sciences, 271(1546), 1331-1336. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2004.2738 759 
 760 
Cage, E., Pellicano, E., Shah, P.,  & Bird, G. (2013). Reputation management: evidence for 761 
ability but reduced propensity in autism. Autism Research, 6, 433-442. 762 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/aur.1313 763 
 764 
Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2004). `Unwilling' versus `unable': 765 
chimpanzees' understanding of human intentional action. Developmental Science, 766 
7(4), 488-498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x 767 
 768 
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in 769 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo 770 
sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112(2), 192-206. 771 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.112.2.192 772 
 773 
Canteloup, C., Piraux, E., Poulin, N., & Meunier, H. (2016). Do Tonkean macaques 774 
(Macaca tonkeana) perceive what conspecifics do and do not see? PeerJ, 4:e1693 775 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1693 776 
 777 
Carruthers, P., (2013). Evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy 778 
of Sciences of the USA, 110(Supplement 2), 10371-10378. 779 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1301195110 780 
 781 
Clutton-Brock, T. H., O'riain, M. J., Brotherton, P. N., Gaynor, D., Kansky, R., Griffin, A. S., 782 
& Manser, M. (1999). Selfish sentinels in cooperative mammals. Science, 284(5420), 1640-783 
1644. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.284.5420.1640 784 
 785 
Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by 786 
scrub jays. Nature, 395(6699), 272-274. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/26216 787 
 788 
Coricelli, G., Joffily, M., Montmarquette, C., & Villeval, M.C. (2010). Cheating, emotions, 789 
and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion. Experimental Economics, 13(2), 226-247. 790 
 791 
Correia, S. P., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Western scrub-jays anticipate future 792 
needs independently of their current motivational state. Current Biology, 17(10), 856-861. 793 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.03.063 794 
 795 
Costes-Thiré, M., Levé, M., Uhlrich, P., Pasquaretta, C., De Marco, A., & Thierry, B. (2015). 796 
Evidence that monkeys (Macaca tonkeana and Sapajus apella) read moves, but no evidence 797 
that they read goals. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 129(3), 304-310. 798 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039294 799 
 800 
Côté, I. M. (2000). Evolution and ecology of cleaning symbioses in the sea. Oceanography 801 
and Marine Biology, 38, 311–355. Taylor & Francis, CRS Press, United Kingdom. 802 
 803 
da Cunha, F. C. R., Fontenelle, J. C. R., & Griesser, M. (2017). The presence of conspecific 804 
females influences male-mobbing behavior. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 71(3), 52. 805 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00265-017-2267-7 806 
 807 
Curry, O.S., Price, M.E., & Price, J.G. (2008). Patience is a virtue: cooperative people have 808 
lower discount rates. Personality and Individual Differences, 44(3), 778-783. 809 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.09.023 810 
 811 
Dere, D., Zlomuzica, A., Dere, E. (2019). Fellow travellers in cognitive evolution: Co-812 
evolution of working memory and mental time travel? Neuroscience & Biobehavioral 813 
Reviews, 105, 94-105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.07.016. 814 
 815 
Diamond, A., & Doar, B. (1989). The performance of human infants on a measure of frontal 816 
cortex function, the delayed-response task. Developmental Psychobiology, 22(3), 271-294. 817 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/dev.420220307 818 
 819 
Dunfield, K. A., & Kuhlmeier, V. A. (2010). Intention-mediated selective helping in infancy. 820 
Psychological science, 21(4), 523-527. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610364119 821 
 822 
Dunfield, K., Kuhlmeier, V. A., O’Connell, L., & Kelley, E. (2011). Examining the diversity 823 
of prosocial behavior: Helping, sharing, and comforting in infancy. Infancy, 16(3), 227-247. 824 
 825 
Engelmann, J. M., Herrmann, E., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Five-year olds, but not 826 
chimpanzees, attempt to manage their reputations. PLoS One 7:e48433. 827 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048433 828 
 829 
Engelmann, J. M., Herrmann, E., & Tomasello, M. (2016). The effects of being watched on 830 
resource acquisition in chimpanzees and human children. Animal Cognition, 19(1), 147-151. 831 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0920-y 832 
 833 
Evans, T. A., & Beran, M. J. (2007). Chimpanzees use self-distraction to cope with 834 
impulsivity. Biology Letters, 3, 599-602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2007.0399 835 
 836 
Flavell, J. H. (1977). The development of knowledge about visual perception. Nebraska 837 
Symposium on  Motivation,  25, 43–76. 838 
 839 
Flavell, J. H., Everett, B. A., Croft, K., & Flavell, E. R. (1981). Young children's knowledge 840 
about visual perception: Further evidence for the Level 1–Level 2 distinction. Developmental 841 
Psychology, 17(1), 99-103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.17.1.99 842 
 843 
Flombaum, J. & Santos, L. (2005). Rhesus monkeys can assess the visual perspective of 844 
others when competing for food. Current Biology, 15(5), 447-452. 845 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2004.12.076 846 
 847 
Fuster, J.M. (2001). The prefrontal cortex – an update: Time is of the essence. Neuron, 30(2), 848 
319-333. 849 
 850 
Gathercole, S.E., S.J. Pickering, B. Ambridge, B. & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of 851 
working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Development Psychology, 40(2), 177-190.  852 
http://dx. doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.2.177  853 
 854 
Gerber, A.A., Green, D.P., & Larimer, C.W. (2008). Social pressure and voter turnout: 855 
evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 33-856 
48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305540808009X 857 
 858 
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Rational imitation in preverbal infants. 859 
Nature, 415(6873), 755. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/415755a 860 
 861 
Grueneisen, S. & Tomasello, M. (2017). Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by 862 
taking turns and along dominance asymmetries. Developmental Psychology, 53(2), 265-273. 863 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000236 864 
 865 
Grutter, A. S. (1995). The relationship between cleaning rates and ectoparasites loads in coral 866 
reef fishes. Marine Ecology Progress Series, 118, 51–58. 867 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3354/meps118051 868 
 869 
Grutter, A.S., & Bshary, R. (2003). Cleaner wrasse prefer client mucus: support for partner 870 
control mechanisms in cleaning interactions. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. 871 
Series B: Biological Sciences, 270 (Supplement 2), S242–S244. 872 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2003.0077 873 
 874 
Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what 875 
conspecifics do and do not see. Animal Behaviour, 59(4), 771-785. 876 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377 877 
 878 
Hare, T. A., Camerer, C. F., & Rangel, A. (2009). Self-control in decision-making involves 879 
modulation of the vmPFC valuation system. Science, 324(5927), 646–648. 880 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1168450 881 
 882 
Harris, A.C., & Madden, G.J. (2002). Delay discounting and performance on the Prisoner’s  883 
Dilemma Game. Psychological Record, 52(4), 429-440. 884 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF03395196 885 
 886 
Herrmann, E., Keupp, S., Hare, B., Vaish, A., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Direct and indirect 887 
reputation formation in nonhuman great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, 888 
Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 889 
127(1), 63–75. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028929 890 
 891 
Heyes, C.M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 892 
21(1), 101-148. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X98000703 893 
 894 
Heyman, G., Barner, D., Heumann, J., & Schenck, L. (2014). Children's sensitivity to ulterior 895 
motives when evaluating prosocial behavior. Cognitive science, 38(4), 683-700. 896 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12089 897 
 898 
Inoue, S., & Matsuzawa, T. (2007). Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees. Current 899 
Biology, 17(23), R1004-R1005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.10.027 900 
 901 
Izuma, K. (2012). The social neuroscience of reputation. Neuroscience research, 72(4), 283-902 
288. 903 
 904 
Izuma, K., Matsumoto, K., Camerer, C.F., & Adolphs, R. (2011). Insensitivity to social 905 
reputation in autism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(42), 17302-906 
17307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1107038108 907 
 908 
Johnstone, R. A., & Bshary, R. (2004). Evolution of spite through indirect reciprocity. 909 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 271(1551), 1917-910 
1922. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2581 911 
 912 
Johnstone, R. A., & Bshary, R. (2007). Indirect reciprocity in asymmetric interactions: when 913 
apparent altruism facilitates profitable exploitation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 914 
Biological Sciences, 274(1629), 3175-3181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2581 915 
 916 
Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. The Review of Economic 917 
Studies, 59(1), 63-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2297925 918 
  919 
Karg, K., Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2015). The goggles experiment: can 920 
chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see? Animal Behaviour, 105, 921 
211-221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028 922 
 923 
Karg, K., Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Differing views: Can chimpanzees 924 
do Level 2 perspective-taking? Animal Cognition, 19, 555-564. 925 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7 926 
 927 
Kawai, N., Nakagami, A., Yasue, M., Koda, H., & Ichinohe, N. (2019). Common marmosets 928 
(Callithrix jacchus) evaluate third-party social interactions of human actors but Japanese 929 
monkeys (Macaca fuscata) do not. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 133(4), 488–495. 930 
https://doi.org/10.1037/com0000182 931 
 932 
Kazim, A. J. N., & Aureli, F. (2005). Redirection of aggression: multiparty signalling within 933 
a network? In P. McGregor (Ed) Animal Communication Networks, pp. 191-218. 934 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 935 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610363.013 936 
 937 
Kelsey, C., Grossmann, T., & Vaish, A. (2018). Early reputation management: Three-year-938 
old children are more generous following exposure to eyes. Frontiers in psychology, 9, 698. 939 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00698 940 
 941 
Kern, J. M., & Radford, A. N. (2018). Experimental evidence for delayed contingent 942 
cooperation among wild dwarf mongooses. Proceedings of the National Academy of 943 
Sciences, 115(24), 6255-6260. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1801000115 944 
 945 
Koomen, R., Grueneisen, S., & Herrmann, E. (2020). Children delay gratification for 946 
cooperative ends. Psychological science, 31(2), 139-148. 947 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797619894205 948 
 949 
Lacetera, N., & Macis, M. (2010). Social image concerns and prosocial behavior: field 950 
evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 951 
76(2), 225-237. 952 
 953 
Langer, J. (1980). The Origins of Logic, Six to Twelve Months. New York, Academic Press. 954 
 955 
Langer, J. (1986). The Origins of Logic: One to Two Years. New York: Academic Press. 956 
 957 
Langer, J. (2000). The heterochronic evolution of Primate cognitive development. In:  Parker, 958 
S.T., Langer, J., McKinney, M.L.(Eds.), Biology, Brains and Behavior. The Evolution of 959 
Human Development.  Santa Fe, American School of Research Press, “Advanced Seminar 960 
Series”, and Oxford, James Currey, pp. 215-235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/biot.2006.1.1.41 961 
 962 
Leimgruber, K. L., Shaw, A., Santos, L. R., & Olson, K. R. (2012). Young children are more 963 
generous when others are aware of their actions. PloS one, 7(10), e48292. http://dx. 964 
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048292 965 
 966 
Luerssen, A., Gyurak, A., Ayduk, O., Wendelken, C., & Bunge, S. A. (2015). Delay of 967 
gratification in childhood linked to cortical interactions with the nucleus accumbens. Social 968 
cognitive and affective neuroscience, 10(12), 1769-1776. 969 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv068 970 
 971 
Ma, F., Zeng, D., Xu, F., Compton, B. J., & Heyman, G. D. (2020). Delay of Gratification as 972 
Reputation Management. Psychological Science, 31(9), 1174-1182. 973 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797620939940 974 
 975 
Manrique, H. M., Walker, M. J. (2017). Early Evolution of Human Memory. London: 976 
Palgrave Macmillan. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64447-9 977 
 978 
Matos, R., & Schlupp, I. (2005). Performing in front of an audience: Signallers and the social 979 
environment. In P. McGregor (Ed.), Animal Communication Networks (pp. 63-83). 980 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610363 981 
 982 
McAuliffe, K., Blake, P. R., & Warneken, F. (2020). Costly fairness in children is influenced 983 
by who is watching. Developmental Psychology, 56(4), 773–782. 984 
https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000888 985 
 986 
McAuliffe, K., Drayton, L.A., Royka, A., Aellen, M., Santos, L.R. & Bshary, R. (submitted) 987 
Do cleaner fish know what others can and cannot see? 988 
 989 
McGregor, P. (Ed.). (2005). Animal Communication Networks. Cambridge University Press. 990 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610363 991 
 992 
McNamara, J. M., Barta, Z., Frohmage, L., & Houston, A. I. (2008). The coevolution of 993 
choosiness and cooperation. Nature, 451(7175), 189-192. 994 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature06455 995 
 996 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: re-enactment of intended acts 997 
by 18-month-old children. Developmental psychology, 31(5), 838-850. 998 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838 999 
 1000 
Milinski, M., & Wedekind, C. (1998). Working memory constrains human cooperation in the 1001 




Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C., & Krambeck, H. J. (2001). Cooperation through 1006 
indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy? Proceedings of the Royal Society of 1007 
London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 268(1484), 2495-2501. 1008 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2001.1809 1009 
 1010 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our 1011 
capacity for processing information. Psychological review, 63(2), 81-97. 1012 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0043158 1013 
 1014 
Miller, J. G. (2007). Cultural psychology of moral development. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen 1015 
(Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (p. 477–499). The Guilford Press. 1016 
 1017 
Miller, R., Boeckle, M., Jelbert, S. A., Frohnwieser, A., Wascher, C. A., & Clayton, N. S. 1018 
(2019). Self-control in crows, parrots and nonhuman primates. Wiley Interdisciplinary 1019 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(6), e1504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1504 1020 
 1021 
Mischel, W., &  Ebbesen, E.B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. Journal of 1022 
Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 329–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0029815 1023 
 1024 
Mischel, H. N., & Mischel, W. (1983). The development of children’s knowledge of self-1025 
control strategies. Child Development, 54(3), 603-619. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1130047 1026 
 1027 
Moll, H., & Meltzoff, A.N. (2011). How does it look? Level 2 perspective-taking at 36 1028 
months of age. Child development, 82(2), 661-673. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-1029 
8624.2010.01571.x 1030 
 1031 
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Level 1 perspective-taking at 24 months of age. British 1032 
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24(3), 603-613. 1033 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151005X55370 1034 
 1035 
Moriguchi, Y., Tanaka, M., & Itakura, S. (2011).  Executive function in young children and 1036 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): evidence from a non-verbal dimensional change card sort 1037 
task. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 172(3), 252-265. 1038 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221325.2010.534828 1039 
 1040 
Nettle, D., Cronin, K. A., & Bateson, M. (2013). Responses of chimpanzees to cues of 1041 
conspecific observation. Animal Behaviour, 86(3), 595-602. 1042 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.06.015  1043 
 1044 
Ohtsuki, H. & Iwasa, Y. (2007). Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive 1045 
search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation. Journal of Theoretical 1046 
Biology, 24(3), 518–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.01 1047 
 1048 
Okamoto-Barth, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Great apes' understanding of other 1049 
individuals' line of sight. Psychological Science, 18(5), 462-468. 1050 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01922.x 1051 
 1052 
Péron, F., Rat-Fischer, L., Nagle, L., & Bovet, D. (2010). ‘Unwilling’versus ‘unable’: do 1053 
grey parrots understand human intentional actions?. Interaction studies, 11(3), 428-441. 1054 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.11.3.06per 1055 
 1056 
Phillips, W., Barnes, J. L., Mahajan, N., Yamaguchi, M., & Santos, L. R. (2009). 1057 
‘Unwilling’versus ‘unable’: capuchin monkeys’(Cebus apella) understanding of human 1058 
intentional action. Developmental science, 12(6), 938-945. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-1059 
7687.2009.00840.x 1060 
 1061 
Pinto, A.I., Oates, J., Grutter, A.S., & Bshary, R. (2011). Cleaner wrasse Labroides 1062 
dimidiatus are more cooperative in the presence of an audience. Current Biology, 21(13), 1063 
1140–1144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.05.021 1064 
 1065 
Potì, P., Langer, J., Savage-Rumbaugh, S., & Brakke, K. E. (1999). Spontaneous 1066 
logicomathematical constructions by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, P. paniscus). Animal 1067 
Cognition, 2(3), 147-156. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710050035 1068 
 1069 
Povinelli, D.J., & Eddy, T. (1996). What young chimpanzees know about seeing. 1070 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 61(3), 1-189. 1071 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1166159 1072 
 1073 
Povinelli, D. J., Perilloux, H. K., Reaux, J. E., & Bierschwale, D. T. (1998). Young and 1074 
juvenile chimpanzees'(Pan troglodytes) reactions to intentional versus accidental and 1075 
inadvertent actions. Behavioural Processes, 42(2-3), 205-218. 1076 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0376-6357(97)00077-6 1077 
 1078 
Raihani, N., & Power, E. A. (2021). No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: the social costs of 1079 
prosocial behaviour. PsyArXiv. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ebfrg 1080 
 1081 
Rakoczy, H., & Schmidt, M. F. (2013). The early ontogeny of social norms. Child 1082 
Development Perspectives, 7(1), 17-21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12010 1083 
 1084 
Read, D. W. (2008). Working memory: A cognitive limit to non-human primate recursive 1085 
thinking prior to hominid evolution. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(4), 147470490800600413. 1086 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/147470490800600413 1087 
 1088 
Read, D., & Van Der Leeuw, S. (2008). Biology is only part of the story…. Philosophical 1089 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 363(1499), 1959-1968. 1090 
 1091 
Roberts, G. (1998). Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle. 1092 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 265(1394), 427-1093 
431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1998.0312 1094 
 1095 
Roberts, W. A. (2002). Are animals stuck in time? Psychological Bulletin, 128(3), 473–489. 1096 
 1097 
Roberts, G., Raihani, N., Bshary, R., Manrique, H.M., Fariña, A., Samu, F., & Barclay, P. 1098 
(submitted). The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-1099 
based partner choice. Manuscript submitted to this special issue of Philosophical 1100 
Transactions of the Royal Society.  1101 
 1102 
Russell, Y. I., Call, J., & Dunbar, R. I. (2008). Image scoring in great apes. Behavioural 1103 
processes, 78(1), 108-111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2007.10.009 1104 
 1105 
Rutland, A., Cameron, L., Bennett, L., & Ferrell, J. (2005).  Interracial contact and racial 1106 
constancy: A multi-site study of racial intergroup bias in 3–5 year old Anglo-British children. 1107 
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 26(6),699-713. 1108 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2005.08.005  1109 
 1110 
Salvadori, E., Blazsekova, T., Volein, A., Karap, Z., Tatone, D., Mascaro, O., & Csibra, G. 1111 
(2015). Probing the strength of infants' preference for helpers over hinderers: Two replication 1112 
attempts of Hamlin and Wynn (2011). PloS one, 10(11), e0140570. 1113 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0140570 1114 
 1115 
Santos, L. R., Nissen, A. G., & Ferrugia, J. A. (2006). Rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, 1116 
know what others can and cannot hear. Animal Behaviour, 71(5), 1175–1181. 1117 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.10.007 1118 
 1119 
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2018). Social norm complexity and past 1120 
reputations in the evolution of cooperation. Nature, 555(7695), 242-245. 1121 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature25763 1122 
 1123 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to imagine the 1124 
future: The prospective brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(9), 657–661.  1125 
 1126 
Schino, G., Boggiani, L., Mortelliti, A., Pinzaglia, M., & Addessi, E. (2021). Testing the two 1127 
sides of indirect reciprocity in tufted capuchin monkeys. Behavioural Processes, 182, 1128 
104290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2020.104290 1129 
 1130 
Schmidt, M.F.H., & Rakoczy, H. (2019) On the uniqueness of human normative attitudes. In: 1131 
Bayertz, K., Roughley, N. (eds) The normative animal? On the anthropological significance 1132 
of social, moral and linguistic norms. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1133 
 1134 
Schnell, A.K., Boeckle, M., Rivera, M., Clayton, N.S., & Hanlon, R.T. (2021). Cuttlefish 1135 
exert self-control in a delay of gratification task. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. 1136 
Series B: Biological Sciences. 288(1946), 20203161. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.3161 1137 
 1138 
Sebastián-Enesco, C., & Warneken, F. (2015). The shadow of the future: 5-year-olds, but not 1139 
3-year-olds, adjust their sharing in anticipation of reciprocation. Journal of Experimental 1140 
Child Psychology, 129, 40–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.08.007 1141 
 1142 
Seligman, M. E. P., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2013). Navigating into the 1143 
future or driven by the past. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(2), 119–141. 1144 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612474317 1145 
 1146 
Shaw, A., Montinari, N., Piovesan, M., Olson, K.R., Gino, F., & Norton, M.I. (2014). 1147 
Children Develop a Veil of Fairness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 1148 
363–375. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031247 1149 
 1150 
Sjåstad, H. (2019). Short-sighted greed? Focusing on the future promotes reputation-based 1151 
generosity. Judgment and Decision Making, 14(2), 199–213.  1152 
 1153 
Smith, E. A., & Bliege Bird, R. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening public 1154 
generosity as costly signaling. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21(4), 245–261. 1155 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3 1156 
 1157 
Skinner, B. F.  (1953). Science and Human Behavior. Free Press. 1158 
 1159 
Spinozzi, G., Natale, F., Langer, J. & Brakke, K.E. (1999). Spontaneous class grouping 1160 
behavior by bonobos (Pan paniscus) and common chimpanzees (P. troglodytes). Animal 1161 
Cognition, 2(3), 157-170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710050036 1162 
 1163 
Stephens, D.W., McLinn, C.M., & Stevens, J.R. (2002). Discounting and reciprocity in an 1164 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Science, 298, 2216-2218. 1165 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1078498 1166 
 1167 
Subiaul, F., Vonk, J., Okamoto-Barth, S. et al. (2008). Do chimpanzees learn reputation by 1168 
observation? Evidence from direct and indirect experience with generous and selfish 1169 
strangers. Animal Cognition, 11(4), 611–623. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6 1170 
 1171 
Suddendorf, T. (2013). The gap: The science of what separates us from other animals. New 1172 
York, NY, US: Basic Books. 1173 
 1174 
Susini, I., Safryghin, A., Hillemann, F., & Wascher, C. A. F. (2020). Delay of gratification in 1175 
non-human animals: A review of inter- and intra-specific variation in performance. BioRxiv. 1176 
https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.05.078659 1177 
 1178 
Tomasello, M. (2019). The moral psychology of obligation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1179 
43, 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19001742 1180 
 1181 
Triki, Z., Wismer, S., Levorato, E., & Bshary, R. (2018). A decrease in the abundance and 1182 
strategic sophistication of cleaner fish after environmental perturbations. Global Change 1183 
Biology, 24, 481–489. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gcb.13943 1184 
 1185 
Triki, Z., Emery, Y., Teles, M.C., Oliveira, R.F., & Bshary, R. (2020). Brain morphology 1186 
predicts social intelligence in wild cleaner fish. Nature Communications, 11, 6423. 1187 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20130-2 1188 
 1189 
Trösch, M., Bertin, E., Calandreau, L., Nowak R. & Lansade, L. (2020). Unwilling or willing 1190 
but unable: can horses interpret human actions as goal directed? Animal Cognition, 23, 1035–1191 
1040. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-020-01396-x 1192 
 1193 
Van de Vondervoort, J. W., & Hamlin, J. K. (2018). The early emergence of sociomoral 1194 
evaluation: infants prefer prosocial others. Current Opinion in Psychology, 20, 77-81. 1195 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.014 1196 
 1197 
Van de Waal, E., Borgeaud, C., & Whiten, A. (2013). Potent social learning and conformity 1198 
shape a wild primate’s foraging decisions. Science, 340(6131), 483-485. 1199 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1232769 1200 
 1201 
Völter, C. J., Mundry, R., Call, J., & Seed, A. M. (2019). Chimpanzees flexibly update 1202 
working memory contents and show susceptibility to distraction in the self-ordered search 1203 
task. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 286(1907): 20190715. 1204 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0715 1205 
 1206 
Vaish, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Sympathy through affective perspective 1207 
taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers. Developmental psychology, 45(2), 1208 
534-543. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014322 1209 
 1210 
Vaish, A., Missana, M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Three-year-old children intervene in third-1211 
party moral transgressions. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 29(1), 124-130. 1212 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151010X532888 1213 
 1214 
Vonasch, A. J., Reynolds, T., Winegard, B. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2018). Death before 1215 
dishonor: Incurring costs to protect moral reputation. Social Psychological and Personality 1216 
Science, 9(5), 604–613. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617720271 1217 
 1218 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age. 1219 
Infancy, 11(3), 271-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2007.tb00227.x 1220 
 1221 
Washburn, D. A., Gulledge, J. P., James, F., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2007). A species 1222 
difference in visuospatial working memory: Does language link “what” with “where”?. 1223 
International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 20(1), 55-64. 1224 
 1225 
Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The perception of 1226 
rational, goal-directed action in nonhuman primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402-1405. 1227 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1144663 1228 
 1229 
Wu, J., Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. (2016). Reputation management: Why and how 1230 
gossip enhances generosity. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(3), 193-201. 1231 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.11.001  1232 
 1233 
Wu, J., Balliet, D., Tybur, J. M., Arai, S., Van Lange, P. A., & Yamagishi, T. (2017). Life 1234 
history strategy and human cooperation in economic games. Evolution and Human Behavior, 1235 
38(4), 496-505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.03.002 1236 
 1237 
Yoeli, E., Hoffman, M., Rand, D.G., & Nowak, M.A. (2013). Powering up indirect 1238 
reciprocity with a large-scale field experiment. Proceedings of the National Academy of 1239 
Sciences of the USA, 110(Supplement 2), 10424-10429.  1240 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1301210110 1241 
 1242 
Zahavi, A. (1995). Altruism as a handicap: the limitations of kin selection and reciprocity. 1243 
Journal of Avian Biology, 26(1), 1-3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3677205 1244 
 1245 
Author Note 1246 
Héctor M. Manrique wants to thank Professor Álvaro Arrizabalaga and the MINECO 1247 
project with reference HAR2017-82483-C3-1-P for financial support.  1248 
Nichola Raihani was supported by a Royal Society University Research Fellowship and 1249 
by the Leverhulme Trust.  1250 
Pat Barclay was supported by the Social Science & Humanities Research Council of 1251 
Canada (SSHRC grant 430287). 1252 
Redouan Bshary was supported by the Swiss Science Foundation (grant 1253 
310030_192673). 1254 
Andrea Fariña was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the 1255 
European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (AdG agreement n° 1256 
785635; PI Carsten K.W. De Dreu). 1257 
Flóra Samu was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the 1258 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 1259 
648693, PI: Károly Takács). 1260 
Competing interests: NR is the author of the forthcoming book, The Social Instinct: How 1261 
Cooperation Shaped the World 1262 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Héctor Marín Manrique, 1263 
Department of Psychology and Sociology, Universidad de Zaragoza, Campus Universitario 1264 
de Teruel, Ciudad Escolar, s/n. 44003 Teruel (Spain). E-mail: manrique@unizar.es; Tel: +34 1265 
– 978 – 645343;   Fax: +34 – 978 – 618103  1266 
Héctor M. Manrique  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1943-340X 1267 
  1268 
 1269 
  1270 
 1271 
 1272 
 1273 
 1274 
 1275 
 1276 
 1277 
